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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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PLDX-15

WS 34

3/0/W/T2038-63
2 Dec 63

MFA INFORMATION BULLETIN NR. 51, 26 November 1963

FR Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TO Berlin:^a Polish Embassy

Msg. Nr. 13401

26 Nov 63 1600
Routine

[EXTRACT]^b

For the Chief of Mission.

Information Bulletin Nr. 51, 26 November 1963.

I. Washington, 24 November (DROZNIAK).

After JOHNSON's first meeting with members of government and congress an even more general opinion [25-50M] internal will be continued by him in principle, although by different methods. It is believed that the role of RUSK and the State Department will grow greater. JOHNSON is to assure MIKOYAN that he will follow KENNEDY's line. MIKOYAN's presence [at the funeral] is evaluated as KhrUSHcheV's gesture of good will and his intention to follow the same policy toward the USA [25-50M] DE GAULLE: the wish to take advantage of JOHNSON's inexperience to play the role of a man of providence and solidarity with the USA.

B. JOHNSON will concentrate on consolidating his position in the party and country. He assumes that he will be a candidate in the elections. In both parties [25-50M] is expected. The Republicans believe that their chances have improved.

II. New York, 25 November. (Information received from LEWANDOWSKI.)

The struggle on the political implication of the assassination continues between the right and groups close to KENNEDY. It will probably pass to the

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 3 PAGES

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foreign and domestic policies of the new president. Even though the right was unable to raise anti-Communist feelings in the nation and thus force JOHNSON's immediate abandonment of the KENNEDY line, it is, however, widening its influences. Its representatives in Congress began an open attack of KENNEDY's policy of looking for agreements with the Soviet Union, and thus emphasized the hope that JOHNSON will not be such a "green politician." Western European and Scandinavian delegations with whom we talked avoided all speculations on the outcome of the meetings with MIKOYAN, DE GAULLE and ERHARD.

III. Berlin, 24 November.

According to United States Armed Forces Radio in Berlin, a state of full alert of the Bundeswehr was announced in the FRG on 23 November after KENNEDY's assassination. The tone of the FRG propaganda was sad, and in a form not offensive to the right emphasized that KENNEDY's policy was favorable to the FRG. The massive funeral displays were organized only in West Berlin and not in the FRG. This discounted KENNEDY's attitude towards West Berlin and is an attempt "to fall in line with KENNEDY's successor."

44 USC 2107(5)(g)(2)(D)(i)

IV. Lagos [25-50M]

AZIKIV in a message considers KENNEDY a victim of racial hatred. He questions the retention of UN offices in the States. All commentaries play up the racial question.

V. Rio, 23 November.

A. According to the embassy the change in the USA shocked political circles who now expect USA policy towards Latin America to take a turn to the right.

B. The domestic situation is tense. Fear of a crisis with violent outcomes exists.

VI. Paris, 24 November.

According to French and German press circles, DE GAULLE during his meeting with ERHARD placed emphasis on the establishment of a friendly atmosphere. The talks were of a probing nature. The differences of opinion: According to ERHARD, Europe must be firmly allied with the USA and according to DE GAULLE the reverse is desired. ERHARD believed that USA-USSR dialogue was useful

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(by maintaining certain borders and concessions from the USSR). According to DE GAULLE, the dialogue was not necessary and gave no results. ERHARD raised the importance of trade with Socialist countries.

VII. Baghdad, 25 November.

Before the formation of the government, three groups appeared in the officer corps:

- A. The Nationalists [who] demanded liquidation of the Ba'ath,
- B. [a group which] agreed against the inclusion of the Ba'ath in the government but without its liquidation,
- C. [one which] demanded the inclusion of the Ba'ath in the government.

ARIF announced a non-partisan government whose aim is the consolidation of the nation. The officers gave him an ultimatum: Complete the consolidation in eight weeks or resign, the government will not represent any party, allow the Ba'athist to take part, release all political prisoners. Ba'ath supporters defeated the liquidation of the national guard which is only disarmed, the cadres (20-40M) the nationalists [25-50M]

VIII. Damascus, 23 November.

According to the embassy, HAFEZ's conciliatory tone towards ARIF and his justification of the events in Iraq is due to his desire to save the Ba'athists in Iraq. A break with Iraq would indicate a breakdown of the policy [25-50M] Syria as well as bringing ARIF closer to NASSER. From this stem the compliments to ARIF and strong attacks on NASSER.

44 USC 2107(5)(g)(2)(D)(i)

IX. Havana. 22 November.

According to a Venezuelan source, the National Liberation Movement is establishing permanent representation in Havana, increases its contacts, and intends to establish representations in Europe -- the first being in Prague.

The Cabinet of the Minister.

- a. Circular message; also sent to Hanoi, Paris, Stockholm and Budapest.
- b. Remainder of text irrelevant.

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